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Abstract
The value of land in the balance sheet of French firms correlates positively with their hir-
ing and investment flows. To explore the relationship between these variables, we develop
a macroeconomic model with firms that are subject to both credit and labor market fric-
tions. The value of collateral is driven by the forward-looking dynamics of the land price,
which reacts endogenously to fundamental and non-fundamental (sunspot) shocks. We
calibrate the model to French data and find that land price shocks give rise to significant
amplification and hump-shaped responses of investment, vacancies and unemployment
that are in line with the data. We show that both the endogenous movements in the
firms’ discount factor and the sluggish response of the land price are key elements that
drive the results.
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1 Introduction
Recent evidence suggests that real estate collateral is an important determinant of firms’
employment decisions. Using administrative data for French firms, Chaney et al. (2013) show
that shocks to the value of real estate have sizeable effects on employment and investment.
The impact of collateral on investment appears to be larger for French firms than for the
US firms covered by the Compustat database (Chaney et al. (2012)).1 Moreover, investment
appears to be considerably more sensitive to cash-flow variations in France, which suggests that
French firms may be more financially constrained. To better understand how the labor market
responds to shocks to the firms’ collateral value, this paper builds a canonical macroeconomic
model with financially constrained firms and search frictions in the labor market. We calibrate
the model to France and relate its business-cycle features to those in the data. In particular,
we find that the model response to a shock to collateral value features amplification and
propagation that are in line with those obtained from a VAR analysis.
Our business–cycle model features collateral constraints and forward–looking land prices as
in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kocherlakota (2000), on the one hand, and labor market
frictions similar to Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), on the other hand. Firms hold productive
land and capital, and they borrow in an international credit market, using land and (a fraction
of) capital as collateral.2 In the labor market, firms post vacancies and they are matched with
unemployed workers who are hired for production in the subsequent period.
To uncover the business–cycle relationships between collateral prices, investment and labor
market dynamics, we introduce three types of shocks into our model: (i) TFP shocks; (ii)
shocks to the collateral constraint (“financial shocks”); and (iii) shocks to the transaction
price of land (“land price shocks”). We think of (ii) as any disruptions in financial markets
that change the amount of funds channeled from lenders to borrowers. Although shocks (i)
(as in, e.g., Kocherlakota (2000)) and (ii) alone induce endogenous movements in land prices,
this amplification is quantitatively too small to account for the observed volatility in the data.
We think of shock (iii) as a short-cut to describe movements in the demand for land, without
making the underlying mechanism explicit. This allows us to distinguish explicitly between
those events that change the value of land collateral and other types of financial shocks that
1Specifically, a 1$ increase in collateral value raises investment for US firms by 0.06$, whereas the effect
for French firms is about three times as large. Of course, the two firm samples are not directly comparable,
since Compustat does not cover private (and smaller) firms which are more bank-dependent. Further studies
on the role of financial constraints on employment based on US firm-level data are Benmelech et al. (2011) and
Chodorow-Reich (2014).
2Our focus on land (as opposed to real estate) builds on Davis and Heathcote (2007), who show that
fluctuations in US firms’ real estate are largely driven by those in the land value.
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directly affect the intermediation between borrowers and lenders, as in the recent literature
(e.g., Kiyotaki et al. (2011), Liu et al. (2013b), Justiniano et al. (2013)).
When we calibrate our model to the French economy, we find that the dynamic response to
shocks of type (iii) is especially relevant and exhibits large amplification and hump-shaped
responses of vacancies, unemployment and investment. The responses differ notably because
the land price shock significantly relaxes the credit constraint and thus takes an impact on
the firms’ discount factor. We show that the dynamics of the firms’ discount factor plays a
key role in the response of hiring which is a new amplification channel relative to the existing
macro-labor literature. The explanation is that constrained firms react to a relaxation of credit
constraints by augmenting current profit income at the expense of future income, which raises
the discount factor and induces firms to expand investment and hiring faster.
Besides this channel, the key factor behind the propagation result is that the unique steady-
state equilibrium is locally indeterminate, which means that the land price not only depends
on fundamentals but also reacts to self-fulfilling beliefs (sunspots). The intuition for this result
is a “pecuniary externality” in the collateral constraint: if firms expect the land price to go
up in the future, they expect relaxed credit constraints which induces them to borrow and
invest more, and hence to demand more inputs which in turn bids up the land price. As
a consequence, the initial expectation is fulfilled. In the absence of sunspot shocks, on the
other hand, the land price reacts to fundamental shocks in a sluggish fashion. This sluggish
adjustment accounts for a slow build up of collateral capacity and hence to a hump-shaped
response of investment and vacancies to a (fundamental) land price shock. In contrast, pure
sunspot shocks or shocks to the collateral constraint generate dynamics that are at odds with
the data. Our paper departs from the literature reviewed below by showing that the dynamics
of investment and labor market variables under fundamental shocks to the land price are
empirically relevant when the steady state is locally indeterminate.
Our work relates to a recent literature that incorporates financial frictions into macroeconomic
models with search frictions in the labor market. In an early contribution, Wasmer and Weil
(2004) introduce frictional search in the credit market and obtain a financial accelerator effect,
while Dromel et al. (2010) show how unemployment becomes persistent under credit market
frictions in a related model. Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) consider a stochastic version
of a similar model, generating a dynamic financial multiplier which amplifies the impact of
productivity shocks on labor market tightness significantly.
Monacelli et al. (2011) introduce borrowing constraints into a macroeconomic model with
labor search frictions; while they argue that these constraints do not directly prevent firms
from hiring, they show that higher debt improves firms’ bargaining position, which takes a
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negative (positive) effect on wages (job creation). Boeri et al. (2013) let unconstrained firms
choose an optimal level of leverage, together with job creation and job destruction; they show
that credit market conditions have an effect on job creation and on job destruction. As in our
paper, financial conditions take a direct impact on job creation of financially constrained firms
in Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) who focuses on the amplification and propagation of productivity
shocks but does not consider the dynamics of collateral value.
Closely related to our paper is Liu et al. (2013a) who consider a quantitative macroeconomic
model with labor and credit market frictions in which shocks to land prices affect the firms’
collateral capacity. Estimating their model to US data, they also obtain labor market ampli-
fication of land price shocks, although their model does not generate hump-shaped impulse
responses for vacancies. Also, different from our model, they include consumption habits as
well as shocks to wage setting and to the matching function.3 On the other hand, multiplicity
and self-fulfilling beliefs play a key role in the paper of Miao et al. (2013) who show how a
collapsing stock market bubble tightens credit constraints which induces firms to cut hiring.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the role of firms’
land collateral for the business cycle in France. Section 3 introduces the model and Section 4
characterizes the dynamic equilibrium. In Section 5, we calibrate the model to France to
analyze its business cycle features.
2 Land Value and Labor Market Dynamics in France
In this section we discuss the role of firms’ land collateral for business cycle dynamics in the
French economy. We begin with a descriptive analysis by showing some key correlation and
volatility patterns. We then conduct a VAR analysis to understand how shocks to the market
value of land held by the firms affect the labor market.
2.1 Descriptive Statistics
We gather data from national accounts (output, investment, credit market liabilities, and land
at market value for the non-financial business sector) as well as from labor market statistics
(employment, unemployment and vacancies). All time series are available at quarterly frequen-
cies, except data on firm’s balance sheet which are available at annual frequency. Due to data
availability, we restrict the analysis to the period 1978q1–2011q4. We are mainly interested in
3Also, unlike our model, households hold land, which contributes to amplification through a “labor channel”,
induced by wage rigidities due to non-separable utility between consumption goods and housing services. Such
a channel is absent in our model.
3
the role of the market value of land held by non-financial firms; the market value matters in
our model as it reflects the liquidation value taken into account by creditors.
The French national statistics institution (INSEE) provides annual data since 1978 on the
market value of non-financial firms’ assets and liabilities and notably land. We derive land at
market value at the end of each quarter for French firms by linearly interpolating end of the year
values. This is arguably a good approximation as we find, using a quarterly available residential
real estate price index on a sub-period (1996q1–2011q4), that the evolution of French real estate
is close to linear within a year and shows only few intra-year trend reversals. Furthermore, the
volume of land owned by firms at the aggregate level does not change significantly during a
year, so that such volume effects are unlikely to drive the series of land at market value. Our
key labor market indicator is labor market tightness, defined as the ratio between vacancies
and unemployment, which is available for France from 1989 onwards. The aggregate real wage
is calculated as the product between labor productivity and the labor income share. All time
series are seasonally adjusted and expressed in logs, and all nominal variables are deflated with
the GDP deflator. As we cannot reject the hypothesis that our main series have unit roots, we
detrend all series using the band pass filter of Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) implemented
in Stata.4 More details on the data sources and further descriptive statistics are reported in
Appendix A.
Figure 1 shows time series for the firms’ land value, investment and labor market tightness.
Notably all three series are positively correlated. While investment and land value are about
equally volatile, labor market tightness shows considerably higher volatility.
These findings are also confirmed in Table 1 which reports correlation coefficients and standard
deviations relative to output for several variables. It is notable that the land value as well as
unemployment and vacancies are much more volatile than output. Particularly, labor market
tightness is almost 9 times as volatile as output, which is comparable to the figure for the US
economy. Unsurprisingly, the land value, investment and labor market tightness are highly
procyclical, and the land value is strongly positively correlated with vacancies and tightness.
The real wage is much more stable than output and acyclical.
It is also interesting to point out some differences with the US economy for which we re-
port comparable statistics in Appendix A. Over the same time period, the business cycle is
considerably more stable in France. Relative to output, however, the French economy has
generated almost the same labor market volatility as the US economy. While the land value
4Specifically, the aim is to remove all fluctuations shorter than 1.5 and longer than 8 years, which is standard
practice in the business-cycle literature. A periodogram analysis shows that the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter
does a better job than the Hodrick-Prescott filter in that respect. We also note that drifts have been removed
from all variables.
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Figure 1: Land at market value, investment, and labor market tightness (cyclical components)
in France.
is more volatile in the US, it correlates less strongly with labor market tightness than it does
in France. Another noteworthy difference is that the number of vacancies is highly negatively
correlated to unemployment in the US, whereas the negative relation is weaker in France (see
also Justiniano and Michelacci (2011)). We further observe that credit market liabilities are
more correlated to labor market variables in France than in the US. One possible explanation
could be the well documented fact that firms in France (as in other European countries) rely
more on credit financing than in the US.
2.2 VAR Analysis
In order to study the dynamic relationships between firms’ land value, vacancies, unemploy-
ment and investment, we estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) model with these four vari-
ables. Our estimations are performed with the above-described quarterly French data for the
period 1989q1–2011q4. This study aims at assessing the impact of a structural shock to the
land value on labor market variables and investment. We estimate the reduced-form VAR
A(L)xt = εt, where the 4 × 1 vector xt includes the detrended log values of land, vacancies,
unemployment and investment, εt is a vector of shocks and A(L) is a lag polynomial matrix
with A(0) being the identity matrix.
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Table 1: Comovement and relative volatilities.
Output Land Investment Vacancies Unemployment Tightness Credit liabilities Real wage
Output 1.000 0.460 0.793 0.692 -0.645 0.840 0.349 -0.011
Land 1.000 0.570 0.760 -0.402 0.647 0.096 0.082
Investment 1.000 0.710 -0.689 0.879 0.379 0.124
Vacancies 1.000 -0.468 0.839 0.057 0.044
Unemployment 1.000 -0.867 -0.771 0.401
Tightness 1.000 0.523 -0.164
Credit liabilities 1.000 -0.075
Real wage 1.000
Std. dev. relative 1.000 3.874 3.304 5.228 4.683 8.933 2.940 0.439
to output
Notes: All statistics are based on quarterly variables over the period 1978–2011, except credit market liabilities
(since 1996), vacancies and market tightness (since 1989). See the text and Appendix A for details.
We are interested in identifying the structural shock on firms’ land value, that is to say isolating
the land shock component uncorrelated with the contemporaneous shocks affecting the labor
market or investment, and tracing its effect on the three other variables. We argue that this
structural shock on firms’ land holdings value appropriately reflects the effect of the land price
shock introduced in our theoretical framework. We recover the structural shocks through the
Cholesky decomposition of the estimates of the variance-covariance matrix. We order the
shock to firms’ land value first in this decomposition, thereby allowing labor market variables
and firms’ investment to have feedback effects on the land value through their lagged values
but not through their contemporaneous values.5
Impulse response functions to a one-standard-deviation land value shock are presented in
Figure 2. Vacancies and investment react positively to a positive land value shock, whereas
unemployment reacts negatively.
The land value adjustments following the initial shock (leading to a 1% increase in land value)
exhibit a hump-shaped pattern, peaking at roughly 9% above its steady-state value four quar-
ters after the shock. Vacancies almost do not react on impact, but in subsequent quarters
the variable follows a similar pattern as the land value, peaking at roughly 11% above its
steady-state value five quarters after the shock. Unemployment almost does not react on im-
pact either, and the adjustment is also hump-shaped and a bit more sluggish with a trough
at roughly -10% about seven quarters after the shock. We observe a slight positive response
of investment in the period of the shock and also a more moderate hump-shaped adjustment
5The VAR is estimated with lag lengths of four quarters for each equation. Changing the lag lengths has
little effect on the results. Note also that the results are not sensitive to the ordering of the three remaining
variables.
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than for the three other variables.6
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions to a one-standard-deviation land value shock.
Notes: Dotted lines are 95% confidence bands.
Overall, the results show that structural shocks to firms’ land value drive labor market variables
and investment and that the shock has significant long-lasting and hump-shaped effects on land
value, labor market variables and investment.
3 The Model
We consider a small open economy comprising a unit mass of firms and a unit mass of workers.
Firm owners hold and accumulate capital, buy land, hire workers and borrow in an international
credit market at fixed interest rate R, where borrowing is subject to collateral constraints.7
6For comparison, we also consider a similar VAR model where labor market tightness replaces vacancies.
The results turn out to be very similar: labor market tightness peaks about 6 quarters after the shock with
somewhat higher amplification than vacancies, whereas the responses of the other variables remain unchanged.
7The assumption of a small open economy is a reasonable abstraction for a country like France. An
alternative model framework would be a closed economy in which worker households are more patient than
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Firms produce a common consumption/investment goods from the inputs capital, labor and
land. While capital can be accumulated, the aggregate supply of land is fixed and normalized
to one. Land is traded at price Qt in period t, and the price of capital and consumption goods
is normalized to unity. Workers consume their labor income; neither do they hold land, nor
are they active in the credit market. While the markets for capital and land are frictionless,
the market for labor is subject to search frictions. Finally, there is a government redistributing
income from employed to unemployed workers.
3.1 Firms
Firms use capital Kt, labor Nt and land Lt to produce final output with concave and constant-
returns technology Yt = AtF (Lt, Kt, Nt) where At is aggregate TFP. All three inputs are
installed in the period prior to production. Firms also enter the period with credit market
liabilities Bt. Since there are only aggregate shocks, all firms are identical, so we treat the
firm as a representative firm and we do not distinguish in our notation between aggregate and
firm-level variables.
The owner of the representative firm consumes Ct in period t and has preferences
∞∑
t=0
βtu(Ct) , (1)
where u is a strictly increasing and concave function. In period t the firm faces the budget
constraint:
Bt+1+Yt = Ct+TtQt(Lt+1−Lt)+(1+R)Bt+WtNt+It+φKI
1+ηK
t I
−ηK
t−1 +φNH
ηN
t N
1−ηN
t , (2)
where It is the investment flow, Ht is the hiring flow, φK ≥ 0 and φN ≥ 0 control for investment
and employment adjustment costs, and Bt is credit redeemed in period t. Adjustment costs are
convex in investment growth It/It−1 and in the hiring rate Ht/Nt; that is, we require ηK ≥ 1
and ηN ≥ 1. Wt is the real wage which is bargained bilaterally between the firm and each
individual worker. As we see below, the outcome of this bargain depends only on aggregate
quantities but is independent of the firm’s individual factor choices (Lt, Kt, Nt). Hence the
firm takes Wt as given when it decides about factor inputs. Tt is an exogenous “land wedge”
variable which affects the transaction costs of land. It plays the same role as a tax on land
sales (which is not paid in equilibrium). We later introduce shocks to this variable to capture
any events that take an impact on land demand and hence on the land price. In particular,
firm owners and provide credit to borrowing-constrained firms. We conjecture that the results would be rather
similar.
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we investigate the effects of a decline in the land wedge Tt, which triggers an increase in land
price Qt, on investment and labor market variables.
Borrowing is subject to a collateral constraint of the form
Ψt
[
Qt+1Lt+1 + ω(1− δ)Kt+1
]
≥ (1 +R)Bt+1 , (3)
where Ψt is a collateral constraint parameter which we interpret as financial market conditions
and which may be subject to financial shocks. The term in squared brackets represents collat-
eral of the firm which comprises all land holdings and also a fraction ω ∈ [0, 1] of the capital
stock that can be pledged to the firm’s creditors.
Capital and employment respectively adjust according to:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It , (4)
Nt+1 = (1− s)Nt +Ht , (5)
where s is an exogenous separation rate.8 The firm’s problem is to maximize the owner’s utility
(1) subject to (2), (3), (4) and (5). Write λt, ιt, µt and νt for the Lagrange multipliers on these
four constraints. The first-order conditions with respect to Ct, It, Kt+1, Lt+1, Ht, Bt+1 and
Nt+1 are:
λt = u
′(Ct) , (6)
µt = λt
[
1 + φK(1 + ηK)
{ It
It−1
}ηK]
− βλt+1φKηK
{It+1
It
}1+ηK
, (7)
µt = β(1− δ)µt+1 + βλt+1
∂Yt+1
∂Kt+1
+ ω(1− δ)ιtΨt , (8)
λtQtTt = βλt+1
[∂Yt+1
∂Lt+1
+Qt+1Tt+1
]
+ ιtΨtQt+1 , (9)
νt = λtφNηNh
ηN−1
t , (10)
λt = β(1 +R)λt+1 + ιt(1 +R) , (11)
νt = β(1− s)νt+1 + βλt+1
[ ∂Yt+1
∂Nt+1
−Wt+1 + φN(ηN − 1)h
ηN
t+1
]
. (12)
Define Mft+1 ≡ βλt+1/λt as the firm’s discount factor and write Jt ≡ νt−1/(M
f
t λt−1) for the
firm’s value of an additional worker in period t in units of the consumption good. With
8By focusing on hiring flows, we keep the separation rate fixed for convenience. Given that shocks to the
separation rate play a larger role in Europe than in the US (cf. Justiniano and Michelacci (2011)), it should
be interesting to investigate how shocks to st affect the dynamic responses in this model.
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ht = Ht/Nt denoting the hiring rate, (10) and (12) can be rewritten as:
φNηNh
ηN−1
t = M
f
t+1Jt+1 , (13)
Jt =
∂Yt
∂Nt
−Wt + φN(ηN − 1)h
ηN
t + (1− s)M
f
t+1Jt+1 . (14)
Equation (13) is a standard job-creation condition which links firms’ hiring behavior to the
discounted job value. Equation (14) shows that the job value is a forward-looking variable
which depends on expectations about productivity and wages. The third term on the right-
hand side reflects the reduction in future hiring costs from an additional employee.
3.2 Workers
Workers are able to pool idiosyncratic unemployment risk within a large family. The represen-
tative worker family consumes income Cwt = WtNt + τWt(1 − Nt) − T
w
t , where τ is the wage
replacement ratio and Twt are lump-sum taxes that are set by the government to finance these
transfers. The worker household enjoys utility
∞∑
t=0
βtuw(C
w
t ) , (15)
with strictly increasing and concave uw, possibly different from the utility function of firm
owners. Employment adjusts according to Nt+1 = (1− s)Nt+ ft(1−Nt(1− s)) where ft is the
job-finding rate for unemployed workers.9 If χt is the marginal utility value of an additional
worker in period t, we have
χt = λ
w
t (1− τ)Wt + β(1− s)(1− ft)χt+1 ,
where λwt = u
′(Cwt ). Defining Ωt ≡ χt/λ
w
t for the value of a worker in consumption units and
Mwt+1 ≡ βλ
w
t+1/λ
w
t for the worker’s discount factor, we obtain
Ωt = (1− τ)Wt + (1− s)(1− ft)M
w
t+1Ωt+1 . (16)
3.3 The Labor Market
The labor market is subject to search frictions. All separations (hires) go to (come from) the
unemployment pool, so there are neither job-to-job transitions nor transitions into and out
9It is assumed that a separated worker can search for reemployment within the same period. This is a
reasonable modeling assumption for a quarterly calibration.
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of the labor force. Given that the flow of newly employed workers equals the flow of hires in
period t, the rate at which any of the 1 −Nt(1 − s) unemployed workers finds a job is linked
to aggregate hires according to ft = Ht/[1−Nt(1− s)]. While firms in this model decide the
number of hires, we can also think of them as posting vacancies and anticipating how many of
their vacancies are filled according to a standard matching process.10 That is, the aggregate
vacancies Vt posted by firms are matched with 1 − Nt(1 − s) job seekers through a matching
technology, such that the job-finding rate is an increasing and concave function of the vacancy-
unemployment ratio (market tightness) θt = Vt/[1−Nt(1− s)], i.e. ft = f(θt) with f
′ > 0 and
f ′′ < 0. This implies that market tightness (and therefore vacancies) are determined from
f(θt)[1−Nt(1− s)] = Ht . (17)
Any worker matched to a firm bargains with the firm about the real wage Wt in any pe-
riod t. To render the bargaining outcome independent of the individual firm’s factor choices
(Kt, Nt, Lt), we assume that there is a secondary market for capital and land at which firms
can buy and sell these factors of production after wage bargaining but before the production
stage.11 This assumption implies that the marginal product of labor is only determined by
aggregate market conditions so that the firm essentially operates under constant returns in the
given period. Hence, although our model features multi-worker firms whose production tech-
nology has decreasing returns to labor, the usual difficulties with intrafirm bargaining in those
situations (e.g. Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and Smith (1999)) disappear.12 The Nash bargaining
problem between the firm and each of its workers is then to maximize Ωt
γJt
1−γ , where γ is the
worker’s bargaining power. Equations (14) and (16) imply that
γJt = (1− γ)Ωt . (18)
10A difference between our model (with hiring costs) and standard search and matching models (with va-
cancy costs) is that only in the latter case employment adjustment costs are linked to aggregate labor market
conditions via the aggregate matching function. Such a link is absent in our model.
11Specifically, the timing within each period t is as follows. (1) Firms and workers bargain over the wage; (2)
Firms trade capital and land in the secondary market; (3) firms produce, hire, invest, buy/sell land at price
Qt, then repay the outstanding debt and borrow.
12Formally, because of constant returns, Yt = NtG(
Lt
Nt
, Kt
Nt
) where G is an increasing and concave production
function in intensive form. Prices for land and for capital in the secondary market are PL
t
= G′
1
(l∗
t
, k∗
t
) +Qt
and PKt = G
′
2(l
∗
t , k
∗
t )+1− δ with aggregate l
∗
t =
Lt
Nt
, k∗t =
Kt
Nt
taken as given by the firm. It is then optimal for
the firm to hold ℓ∗
t
units of land and k∗
t
units of capital per employed worker. Therefore, the marginal profit
per worker is G(l∗t , k
∗
t ) + l
∗
t (Qt − P
L
t ) + k
∗
t (1 − δ − P
K
t ) which is identical to the marginal product for labor
and independent of individual factor choices. In equilibrium, no trade in the secondary market is required
since no wage negotiations fail. See Chapter 1.6 in Pissarides (2000) and Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) for similar
arguments.
11
4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the land market is simply Lt = 1. Goods market equilibrium follows from
workers’ and firms’ budget constraints as
Yt = Ct + C
w
t + (1 +R)Bt −Bt+1 + It + φKI
1+ηK
t I
−ηK
t−1 + φNH
ηN
t N
1−ηN
t . (19)
The right-hand side includes consumption expenditures, net exports (that is, net capital ex-
ports) and investment on capital goods and for recruitment expenditures. The left-hand
side is final output from market production. Finally, the government’s budget is balanced,
Twt = τWt(1−Nt) so that consumption of the worker household equals aggregate gross labor
income Cwt =WtNt.
Assume that β˜ ≡ 1/(1 + R) > β which implies that the borrowing constraint binds in and
around the steady state:
Bt+1 = β˜Ψt
[
Qt+1 + ω(1− δ)Kt+1
]
. (20)
Definition: Given a shock process for (At,Ψt, Tt), a competitive equilibrium with binding bor-
rowing constraints are lists of firm plans, (Ct, Kt, Nt, Lt, Ht, It), wages and land prices (Wt, Qt),
vacancy-unemployment ratios (θt), and job values for firms and workers (Jt,Ωt), such that for
all t ≥ 0:
(i) Firm owners maximize their utility (1) subject to budget constraints (2), borrowing con-
straints (3), and factor adjustment (4) and (5).
(ii) The land and the goods market are in equilibrium: Lt = 1 and equation (19).
(iii) Labor market flows are consistent: equation (17).
(iv) Wages satisfy the Nash bargaining solution (18) where Jt and Ωt satisfy (14) and (16).
In Appendix B we characterize equilibrium by a set of 16 equations in the 16 variables
(
Ct, C
w
t , λt, λ
w
t , µt, Yt, Kt, Nt, θt, Jt,Ωt,Wt, Bt, Qt, ht = Ht/Nt, It
)
,
given the exogenous processes for At, Ψt and Tt. The predetermined state variables are
(It−1, Kt, Bt, Nt). In Appendix B we prove that the model has a unique steady state equi-
librium and we show the following:
Proposition 1: A steady state equilibrium is unique. If ω > 0, an increase of the collateral
constraint parameter Ψ (or a decrease of the interest rate R = 1/β˜ − 1) has a positive effect
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on the steady-state values of output Y , employment N , capital K, market tightness θ, the real
wage W and the land price Q. Changes of the land wedge T affect the land price, but have no
effect on output and on the labor market.
An implication of this proposition is that an improvement of financial condition, expressed by
a relaxation of borrowing constraints, leads to a boom in the land price as well as to a tighter
labor market and lower unemployment. Put differently, a permanent financial shock triggers a
co-movement of the firms’ land value and of the labor market. Land price shocks, on the other
hand, cannot have permanent real effects. In the next section we explore the business-cycle
implications of these different shocks to the firms’ collateral constraint.
Before we do that, it is instructive to take a closer look at the first-order condition for hiring,
(13), rewritten as
φNηN(ht)
ηN−1 =
βu′(Ct+1)
u′(Ct)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Mft+1
Jt+1 . (21)
As is well known from the literature on labor market volatility originating from Shimer (2005),
volatility and propagation in hiring must largely be explained by the dynamics of the expected
job value Jt+1, when the discount factor Mt+1 is either constant due to a linear utility frame-
work or moves little due to a representative household assumption (as in Andolfatto (1996)).
Amplification of the job value is difficult to generate, unless wages are rigid and the flow job
surplus is small relative to labor productivity. Other authors argue that variations in job
creation costs on the left-hand side also account for labor market volatility and that financial
frictions contribute to this mechanism (e.g. Petrosky-Nadeau (2014)). In our model, financial
frictions in combination with sluggish adjustment of land collateral give rise to another channel
contributing to labor market volatility and propagation, with much of the action going through
movements in the discount factor.
When firms have an interest to smoothen profit income (dividend payments) over time, con-
strained firms react to a relaxation of collateral constraints in period t by an increase in current
profit income Ct relative to future income Ct+1 which raises the discount factor on the right-
hand side of (21) and thus triggers a rise in hiring. This mechanism depends on our modeling
assumption that firms are operated by independent owners who desire a smooth dividend
stream, which is in line with the finance literature (cf. Lintner (1956), Guttman et al. (2010),
Leary and Michaely (2011)) but absent in standard macroeconomic models with a representa-
tive household. A similar mechanism would be at work if there is a representative capitalist
family, earning aggregate profit income which is more volatile than aggregate consumption.13
13Relatedly, separate groups of workers and capital owners can help to address asset-pricing puzzles in the
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To see the discount factor channel in our model more clearly, we can use the Euler equation
(11) to write the discount factor as follows:
Mft+1 =
βλt+1
λt
= β˜ − ιt
λt
, (22)
where λt = u
′(Ct) is marginal utility, ιt is the multiplier on the collateral constraint (3)
and β˜ = (1 + R)−1. Equations (21) and (22) show that, other things equal, when the credit
constraint relaxes, that is, when ιt goes down, hirings ht go up. So essentially, one expects that
shocks relaxing the credit constraint by a lot should make hirings very responsive. Consistent
with the literature (e.g. Kocherlakota (2000)), the response of the land price to TFP shocks is
not quantitatively significant in our model. As a consequence, a shock to TFP has little direct
impact on the credit constraint and hence cannot be amplified much through this channel. In
contrast, a land wedge shock that has a bigger impact on the land price, has much stronger
labor market responses. To the extent that such shocks propagate through several periods,
they also raise the job value (which depends positively on future discount factors via (14))
which additionally stimulates hiring incentives. This is exactly what happens in our model,
as further illustrated with the simulations of the calibrated model that we present in the next
section.
5 Calibration and Quantitative Results
In this section we calibrate the model to the French economy. We explore the reaction of the
model economy to different shocks and show that especially shocks to the land price contribute
to amplification and propagation of investment and labor market variables that are in line with
the data.
5.1 Calibration
We choose Cobb-Douglas functional forms Yt = AtF (Lt, Kt, Nt) = AtL
ξ
tK
ζ
tN
1−ξ−ζ
t for the
production function and f(θt) = mθ
1−α
t for the matching function. Utility functions for workers
and firm owners are identical, u(C) = uw(C) = C
1−σ/(1 − σ) with coefficient of relative risk
aversion equal to σ = 2.
We calibrate the model at quarterly frequency. All real and financial variables are matched to
targets obtained from the INSEE data for the non-financial business sector.14 For more details
about the calibration, see Appendix C. All parameter choices are summarized in Table 2.
macro-finance literature (cf. Danthine and Donaldson (2002), Guvenen (2009)).
14In particular, output Y is measured as gross value added. Land QL = Q is land at market value, and
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Technology and financial parameters. The share of capital that serves as collateral is
set at ω = 0.3 (see further discussion below). The depreciation rate is δ = 2.7% which gives
rise to 10.5% annual depreciation. Given the steady-state ratios that are fixed at their actual
average values K/Y = 7.31, B/Y = 5.56, Q/Y = 2.35 (see Table 4), we calibrate β˜ = 0.99
(which corresponds to a 4% annual interest rate) and β = 0.98 to match the capital and land
shares in output ζ = 0.37 and ξ = 0.02. It follows that Ψ = 1.25. Regarding the investment
installation costs, we set the level parameter φK = 0.1 to target an investment share in output
of 22% and we set the convexity parameter ηK = 15 to replicate investment volatility relative
to that of the land value under land price shocks. It follows that Tobin’s q equals 1.13.
Labor market parameters. The matching function elasticity is set to α = 0.5 which is in
the range of plausible values for this parameter (Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)). As Shimer
(2005), we arbitrarily normalize tightness15 in steady state to θ = 1 and set the matching
efficiency parameter m = 0.214 to target a mean quarterly job–finding rate of f(θ) = 0.21. The
quarterly separation rate is set to s = 0.021. Both quarterly worker flow rates correspond to the
monthly estimates in Table 2 of Elsby et al. (2013), giving rise to a steady-state unemployment
rate of 1−N = s(1−f)
s+f(1−s)
= 7.2%.16 We set unemployment income τ at 58.2% of wage income (see
Table 1 in Justiniano and Michelacci (2011)), and the wage-to-income ratio at WN/Y = 0.7,
which is the labor income share in France (cf. Table 4). Regarding hiring costs, we deliberately
choose ηN = 1.1 and we calibrate φN = 0.54 so that recruitment costs per hire in steady state
are 14% of quarterly wages (cf. Hall and Milgrom (2008)). It follows from the other calibration
targets that the worker bargaining power parameter is γ = 0.91 (see Appendix C).
One interesting aspect of our calibrated model is that, all other parameter values fixed as in
Table 2, the unique steady state is determinate when ω > 0.4 but becomes indeterminate
when ω ≤ 0.4. The intuition for why indeterminacy arises is tightly linked to the fact that the
collateral constraint depends on the market price of land which is a forward-looking variable
that can possibly react to self-fulfilling beliefs. Intuitively, if all firms expect the land price to
be larger in future periods, they expect abundant credit which enables them to invest more and
hence to demand more inputs which in turn will bid up input prices. As a consequence, the
land price goes up and the initial expectation is fulfilled. Of course, the force of this “pecuniary
externality” depends on the level of the collateral constraint parameter Ψ. With our calibration
credit B are all credit market liabilities. Capital K is structures plus equipment and software at current cost
basis. The labor income share is calculated as compensation of employees divided by gross value added net of
indirect taxes.
15The steady-state value of θ plays no role for the log-linearized model dynamics.
16Since separated workers can search for re-employment within the same quarter, the unemployment rate is
slightly lower than its data average.
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Table 2: Parameter values.
Parameter Value Description
δ 0.027 Capital depreciation rate
A 1 Total factor productivity
σ 2 Firms’ and workers’ relative risk aversion
β˜ 0.99 Lenders’ discount factor
β 0.98 Firms’ and workers’ discount factor
ξ 0.02 Output elasticity to land
ζ 0.37 Output elasticity to capital
s 0.02 Separation rate
α 0.50 Matching function elasticity
m 0.214 Matching function scale
τ 0.58 Wage replacement ratio
γ 0.91 Workers’ bargaining power
ηK 15 Convexity capital installation costs
φK 0.10 Scale capital installation costs
ηN 1.13 Convexity hiring costs
φN 0.54 Scale hiring costs
Ψ 1.25 Collateral constraint parameter
ω 0.30 Share of capital collateralized
strategy, and given the calibration targets for B/Y , K/Y and Q/Y , a lower share of capital
used as collateral, ω, translates into a higher value for Ψ. Essentially, indeterminacy arises in
our calibration when firms can borrow more than the market value of the land they possess,
which is in line with evidence for the French (as well as for the US) non-financial business
sector. There exists, to our knowledge, no source that documents the relative share of land and
capital in collateralized lending to French firms, so it is a difficult task to calibrate parameter
ω. Given that much of the firms’ equipment capital is firm- or industry-specific with low resale
value, however, we suspect that the capital share in collateral value is in reality rather low.
In that sense our calibrated value of capital’s contribution to collateral of about 30% appears
reasonable and conservative.
Although the steady-state is indeterminate when parameters are calibrated according to Table
2, it turns out that pure sunspot shocks to the land price generate responses of investment and
labor market variables that are at odds with the data, as we illustrate in the next section. In
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addition, leverage shocks do not help account for the data either, which is in line with recent
literature (for example, see Kiyotaki et al. (2011), Liu et al. (2013b), Justiniano et al. (2013)).
This is why our main results, that are presented in the following section, rely on fundamental
shocks to the land price, that is, shocks to the land wedge parameter T .
5.2 Main Results
We now show that the responses of the linearized model to land price shocks are empirically
relevant when the steady state is indeterminate. We report the impulse response functions
of the model economy under a negative shock to the land wedge T which follows an AR(1)
process with autocorrelation coefficient equal to 0.98.
Figure 3: Impulse responses to a positive land price shock in the indeterminate model.
In Figure 3, investment, vacancies and tightness are procyclical while unemployment is coun-
tercyclical, which is in line with the data. In addition, investment and labor market variables
respond in an hump-shaped manner, which is broadly consistent with the VAR evidence we
present in Section 2.2. Investment and labor market variables reach their peaks around the
5th quarter, except for unemployment which peaks later, as does its estimated VAR response.
The reason why indeterminacy is key to obtain hump-shaped responses is as follows. When
the steady state is indeterminate, the land price reacts to fundamental shocks in a sluggish
way because those shocks do not affect the price immediately – only current sunspot shocks
can affect the land price contemporaneously. If sunspot shocks are shut down, then the land
price actually does not move at t = 1, that is, when the land wedge shock hits the economy,
as shown in the left panel of Figure 3. At t = 1, however, investment, vacancies and tightness
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shoot up because next period’s land price (that is, at t = 2) goes up and the credit constraint
hence relaxes at impact. In subsequent periods, the land price gradually increases further in
response to the persistent land price shock, which further relaxes the credit constraint and
enhances the incentives both to invest in capital and to create more vacancies. In that sense,
the gradual response of the land price to a land wedge shock under indeterminacy is key for
our amplification and propagation results.
Complementing the impulse response analysis, we also find that the model with only land price
shocks does a reasonably good job at replicating standard deviations and co-movements with
output, see Table 3. Unsurprisingly, the pure land price shock generates too much volatility of
the land value relative to output, and also investment turns out to be too volatile. We expect
that TFP shocks on top of land price shocks can help to improve on these volatilities. As an
additional exercise, we feed in a TFP shock simultaneously with a land price shock and find
that the standard deviations of the model’s moments listed in Table 3 become much closer
to their data counterparts. It is also worth noting that our model can account for the wage
rigidity that is observed in the data, although wages are strongly procyclical in the model
while they are acyclical in French data. Essentially, wage rigidity arises in this model because
the marginal productivity of labor turns out to be rather unresponsive to land wedge shocks.
Table 3: Standard deviations relative to output and correlations with output under land price
shocks in the indeterminate model.
Stand. Deviation Correlation
Variable Model Data Model Data
Land value 6.06 3.87 0.29 0.46
Investment 5.89 3.30 0.38 0.79
Debt 3.53 2.94 0.55 0.35
Vacancies 5.76 5.23 0.57 0.69
Unemployment 4.65 4.68 -0.90 -0.65
Tightness 8.66 8.93 0.75 0.84
Wage 0.72 0.44 0.92 -0.01
For comparison purposes, we report in Figure 4 the economy’s responses to a TFP shock in the
indeterminate model.17 Similar to the effect of a land wedge shock, the land price also responds
17Like the land price shock in Figure 3, the shock to TFP is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with
autocorrelation coefficient 0.98. We make the same assumption regarding leverage shocks in Figure 6 below,
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in a sluggish way to an increase in TFP when sunspot shocks are shut down. However, there
are key differences between Figures 3 and 4. The first difference is that under TFP shocks
investment in capital and in hirings crowd out land investment, essentially because investing
in capital is subject to highly convex adjustment costs while land investment is not. As a
consequence, the land price falls below the steady state in the first periods after the TFP shock,
before moving up so that the credit constraint slightly relaxes later on. In addition, under TFP
shocks the land price is much less volatile than output. For example, the land price’s standard
deviation is about half of output’s for our calibrated parameters. Hence TFP shocks alone
cannot reproduce the observed volatility and co-movement of land prices. Therefore, although
the mechanism that makes the land price response sluggish in the indeterminate model is
also present under alternative sources of disturbances, we argue that movements in the land
investment wedge are empirically more relevant to understand how land price movements affect
investment and the labor market in France than TFP shocks.
Figure 4: Impulse responses to a positive TFP shock in the indeterminate model.
To illustrate the role of indeterminacy for our results, Figure 5 shows the responses of the
economy when it is subjected to land price or TFP shocks and when calibrated as in Table 2
except that ω = 0.44, which in turn implies that the steady state is now determinate. It can
be seen that the determinate model generates monotonic responses of labor market variables
to both land price and TFP shocks, in contrast with the indeterminate model. This is because
the response of the land price is monotonic from t = 2 onwards in both panels of Figure 5,
which essentially implies that the credit constraint relaxes more at impact than in subsequent
periods. In particular, the determinate model generates virtually no propagation for vacancies
while the sunspot innovations have zero autocorrelation.
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and unemployment. While vacancies and market tightness peak on impact, their response
flattens out in the quarter after the shock, in spite of more persistent responses of output,
debt, land price and investment. As a consequence, the responses of investment and the labor
market are not hump-shaped, in sharp contrast with the responses in the indeterminate model
shown in Figure 3 that are more in line with the VAR evidence.
Figure 5: Impulse responses to a land price shock (top) and to a TFP shock (bottom) in the
determinate model.
To further highlight the importance of land price shocks for plausible model dynamics, we
now report the economy’s responses to pure sunspot and leverage shocks in the indeterminate
model. Absent land wedge shocks, the model lacks the amplification mechanism and generates
essentially monotonic responses of the labor market variables. This can be seen in Figure
6 which graphs the dynamics triggered by a fundamental shock to the leverage parameter
Ψt (top) and by a sunspot shock (bottom) both hitting the economy at t = 1, under the
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calibration presented in Table 2. In addition, the corresponding (unreported) moments under
leverage and sunspot shocks are at odds with French data. More precisely, the labor market
variables are much too volatile compared to output and lack any propagation, while the land
price is not volatile enough. In addition, investment and vacancies are negatively correlated
with output while tightness is acyclical. In Figure 6, the undershooting of vacancies and
tightness in response to leverage or sunspot shocks in the first period can be explained by
the fact that firm owners desire faster consumption growth in that period which lowers the
discount factor. To make sense of both panels in Figure 6, it is important to keep in mind that
investment adjustment costs are more convex than hiring adjustment costs in our calibration,
which partially explains why investment crowds out hiring in Figure 6. While none of these
shocks alone can account for plausible impulse responses, their joint interaction with land price
shocks might still be important to account for overall business cycle dynamics and this should
be the object of further analysis that goes beyond examining impulse responses to a single
shock.
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that the role that the endogenous land price plays in the
credit constraint (3) is important. This means that periods of land price booms are periods
in which credit is more abundant because there is more collateral. If we would assume, rather
counter-factually, that lenders do not take into account possible changes in the market value
of land when deciding how much to lend to firms, so that a constant land price would enter
(3), then no relaxation of the credit constraint would happen during land price booms and our
quantitative results would disappear.
The main lesson from these results is that the indeterminate model provides a propagation
mechanism by which financial shocks to the collateral value induce firms to borrow more,
to invest more and to create more vacancies over several quarters after the shock hits the
economy. This mechanism, for which the sluggish endogenous land price dynamics is key,
gives rise to much more volatile and persistent responses of the labor market than those that
can be generated by productivity shocks or by a determinate model in which such endogenous
land price propagation is absent.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide a macroeconomic model in which firms are subject to labor and
credit market frictions and use land and capital as collateralizable assets in borrowing. When
calibrated on French data, a key property of the model is that it generates an indeterminate
steady state provided that the share of capital that is accepted as collateral is sufficiently low.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to leverage shock (top) and sunspot shock (bottom) in the inde-
terminate model.
Our main finding is that the indeterminate model generates amplification and hump-shaped
propagation of fundamental land price shocks that are empirically relevant. In particular, it
replicates the data patterns that investment, vacancies and unemployment follow after a land
price shock hits the economy. In contrast, TFP shocks, leverage shocks or pure sunspot shocks
generate impulse responses that are at odds with the data.
In unreported analysis, we show that similar results also hold for the same model calibrated
on US data. Although the amplification result is broadly in line with Liu et al. (2013a)
who estimate a larger model with Bayesian methods, there are key differences that should be
stressed. First, there is a new channel that amplifies financial shocks to the labor market via the
discount factor of credit-constrained firms. Second, our model generates local indeterminacy,
which may not be easily be picked up by standard Bayesian estimation techniques. Third,
the indeterminacy is precisely the reason why the labor market responses to land price shocks
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are hump-shaped and exhibit considerable persistence which is in line with the data. In view
of these differences, further research that allows determinate and indeterminate models to
compete in the parameter estimations seems promising to uncover how the various shocks
affect investment and labor market dynamics. In addition, it remains an open question to
what extent these results can be extended to European economies that have been subject to
larger real-estate swings, like Spain and the UK, and whether countries with milder land price
movements, like Germany, look any different.
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Appendix A: Data Sources and Further Descriptive Statis-
tics
This appendix reports the data sources and some further statistics. For comparison with the
business cycle in France, we also report some statistics for similarly constructed variables for
the United States.
For France, data on output (gross value added) and investment for the non-financial business
sector are obtained from the INSEE and are available at quarterly frequency. Credit market
liabilities are also available at the INSEE but only at annual frequency and since 1996. Quar-
terly unemployment series are from the INSEE, and quarterly data on vacancies are derived
from the INSEE series on the number of job opportunities registered at the French national
agency for employment which are only available since 1989q1. The labor income series are
quarterly available in the national accounts produced by the INSEE. We derive the income
share dividing the labor income by the gross added value minus indirect taxes (the quarterly
series are also from the national accounts). The labor productivity corresponds to the gross
added value net of indirect taxes divided by the number of employees in the non-financial firms;
we can thus obtain quarterly real wages multiplying the labor share by the labor productivity.
For the US, quarterly series of output, investment and credit market liabilities series for non-
financial business are taken from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board. We
calculate land at market value series by subtracting structures at current cost to real estate at
market value. Quarterly series on the number of unemployed come from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). The number of vacancies is taken from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover
Survey (JOLTS) series built by the BLS combined with the composite Help-Wanted Index of
Barnichon (2010). Based on the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board and
the BLS data, we compute labor share, labor productivity and real wages series in the same
way as for France.
Table 4 reports some sample averages over the full time period. With respect to these statistics,
the two countries are rather similar. One striking difference is the higher credit-to-output ratio
in France which reflects that non-financial firms seem to depend more heavily on external
finance in this country.
Table 5 shows cross-correlations and relative standard deviations for the US economy of our
key aggregate variables which are detrended in the same way as the time series for France. The
last row in the table shows that the business cycle is considerably more volatile in the US than
in France. The correlation coefficients point at some common patterns as in the corresponding
Table 1 for France, but also to noteworthy differences. For instance, the number of vacancies
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Table 4: Sample averages.
France US
Land-output ratio 2.352 2.456
Capital-output ratio 7.307 6.948
Credit-output ratio 5.557 4.081
Investment rate 0.184 0.148
Depreciation rate 0.027 0.016
Labor income share 0.700 0.609
Profit margin 0.291 0.251
Notes: All statistics are based on the period 1978–2011, except credit market liabilities in France (since 1996).
is highly negatively correlated to unemployment in the US, whereas the negative relation is
much weaker in France.
Table 5: Comovement and volatility in the United States.
Output Land Investment Vacancies Unemployment Tightness Credit liabilities Real wage
Output 1.000 0.540 0.897 0.915 -0.945 0.956 0.255 0.597
Land 1.000 0.577 0.394 -0.612 0.551 0.234 0.311
Investment 1.000 0.807 -0.916 0.899 0.480 0.698
Vacancies 1.000 -0.907 0.958 -0.019 0.525
Unemployment 1.000 -0.987 -0.316 -0.563
Tightness 1.000 0.230 0.575
Credit liabilities 1.000 0.646
Real wage 1.000
Std. dev. relative 1.000 5.901 3.003 5.791 5.000 11.001 1.184 0.417
to output
Std. dev. relative 1.869 2.848 1.699 2.071 1.996 2.302 0.753 1.774
to France
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Appendix B: Equilibrium and Proof of Proposition 1
Using (11) to solve for ιt = β˜λt − βλt+1 and substitute in the other first-order conditions, we
obtain the following set of equilibrium conditions:
λt = u
′(Ct) , (23)
µt = λt
[
1 + φK(1 + ηK){
It
It−1
}
ηK]
− βλt+1φKηK{
It+1
It
}
1+ηK
, (24)
µt = β(1− δ)µt+1 + βλt+1
∂Yt+1
∂Kt+1
+ ω(1− δ)Ψt(β˜λt − βλt+1) , (25)
λtQtTt = βλt+1
[∂Yt+1
∂Lt+1
+Qt+1Tt+1
]
+Ψt(β˜λt − βλt+1)Qt+1 , (26)
Mft+1Jt+1 = φNηNh
ηN−1
t , (27)
Jt =
∂Yt
∂Nt
−Wt + φN(ηN − 1)h
ηN
t + (1− s)M
f
t+1Jt+1 , (28)
Ωt = (1− τ)Wt + (1− s)(1− f(θt))M
w
t+1Ωt+1 , (29)
γJt = (1− γ)Ωt , (30)
Bt+1 + Yt = Ct + C
w
t + (1 +R)Bt + It + φKI
1+ηK
t I
−ηK
t−1 + φNh
ηN
t Nt , (31)
Bt+1 = β˜Ψt
[
Qt+1 + ω(1− δ)Kt+1
]
, (32)
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt , (33)
Nt+1 = (ht + 1− s)Nt , (34)
Yt = AtF (1, Kt, Nt) , (35)
ht = f(θt)
1−Nt(1− s)
Nt
, (36)
λwt = u
′
w(C
w
t ) , (37)
Cwt = WtNt . (38)
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Steady-state values satisfy:
λ = u′(C) , (39)
µ/λ = 1 + φK + φKηK(1− β) , (40)
β
λ
µ
FK = 1− β(1− δ)− ωΨ(1− δ)(β˜ − β)
λ
µ
, (41)
βFL = Q[(1 − β)T −Ψ(β˜ − β)] , (42)
βJ = φNηNh
ηN−1 , (43)
J [1− β(1− s)] = φN(ηN − 1)h
ηN + FN −W , (44)
(1− τ)W = Ω
[
1− β(1− s)(1− f(θ))
]
, (45)
γJ = (1− γ)Ω , (46)
Y = C + Cw +RB + (1 + φK)I + φNh
ηNN , (47)
B = β˜Ψ
[
Q+ ω(1− δ)K
]
, (48)
I = δK , (49)
h = s , (50)
Y = AF (1, K,N) , (51)
h = f(θ)
1−N(1− s)
N
, (52)
λw = u
′
w(Cw) , (53)
Cw = WN . (54)
The following proposition, stated in section 4 of the main text, is established from the above
steady-state relationship.
Proposition 1: A steady state equilibrium is unique. If ω > 0, an increase of the collateral
constraint parameter Ψ (or a decrease of the interest rate R = 1/β˜ − 1) has a positive effect
on the steady-state values of output Y , employment N , capital K, market tightness θ, the real
wage W and the land price Q. Changes of the land wedge T affect the land price, but have no
effect on output and on the labor market.
Proof: Uniqueness of the steady state follows by inspection of equations (39)–(54), which can
be solved recursively. The hiring rate is given by (50) while the job values J and Ω follow from
(43) and (46). The marginal product of capital FK and the marginal product of labor minus
the wage FN −W are determined uniquely from (41) and (44), where µ/λ (that is, Tobin’s
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q) is determined from (40). From (52), the job-finding rate f is a decreasing function of 1/N
so that, substituting for f in (45), it follows that the wage W is also a decreasing function of
1/N . Because of constant returns, FK and FN (for given land supply L = 1) are functions
of K/N and L/N = 1/N . Both functions are increasing in 1/N while FK (FN ) is decreasing
(increasing) in K/N . Hence, FN −W and FK uniquely determine the steady-state levels of N
and K. Then market tightness and the real wage follow from (52) and (45), so that workers’
consumption Cw and marginal utility λw follow from (54) and (53). The land price Q and
borrowing B are determined from (42) and (48). Finally, with output Y determined from (51)
and investment I given in (49), firms’ C and λ follow from (47) and (39).
To prove the second and third assertions uses a similar argument. From the previous paragraph,
FN is independent of Ψ and R = 1/β˜−1, while (41) implies that FK decreases (increases) in Ψ
(R) if ω > 0, and FK is independent of these financial variables if ω = 0. Hence, if and only if
ω > 0, an increase of Ψ (or a decrease of R) increases both N and K (this follows because FK
and FN−W are both increasing in 1/N , FK decreases in K/N and FN−W increases in K/N .).
Hence (45), (51) and (52) imply that W , θ and Y are increasing if ω > 0 and independent of
Ψ and R otherwise. The increase of N and K (for ω > 0) implies that FL increases. Hence,
(42) implies that the land price Q increases for any ω ≥ 0. Finally, marginal products FL, FK
and FN are independent of the land wedge T , so that positive changes in the land wedge affect
negatively Q through (42) but have no real effects. 2
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Appendix C: Calibration Details
In view of equation (48), the borrowing constraint parameter follows from
Ψ =
1
β˜
B/Y
Q/Y + ω(1− δ)K/Y
and the calibration targets in Table 4.
From the first-order condition for investment (40) we obtain Tobin’s q:
q ≡ 1 + φK + φKηK(1− β) . (55)
We use φK to calibrate the share of investment cost in output, while ηK is used to target
investment volatility relative to output volatility.
From the first-order conditions for capital and land, equations (41)-(42) the capital and land
shares in output follow from the other targets:
ζ =
qK
βY
[
1− β(1− δ)− ω(1− δ)
Ψ
q
(β˜ − β)
]
. (56)
ξ =
Q
βY
(
1− β −Ψ(β˜ − β)
)
. (57)
From the calibration target, we obtain φ˜N = φN ·N/Y :
c(H,N)
H
= 0.14 ·W ⇒ φ˜Nh
ηN = 0.14
WN
Y
h ,
where c(H,N) = φNh
ηNN is total hiring cost, and we can use that h = s in steady state.
Given that
Y
N
= A1/(1−ζ)(
K
Y
)ζ/(1−ζ)N−ξ/(1−ζ) ,
this yields φN .
In steady state, the first-order condition for vacancies, equation (43), implies
JN
Y
=
1
β
φ˜NηNh
ηN−1 .
Therefore parameter γ follows from (45)-(46) which can be rewritten in terms of the calibration
targets and the other parameters:
γ
1− γ
=
(1− τ)WN
Y
[1− β(1− s)(1− f)]JN
Y
.
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